یک دگرگونی راهبُردیک (استراتژیک) بجای گفتگوهای بی سرانجام هسته ای و جنگ

دکتر شاهین فاطمی

چکیده:

یک راه کارساز برای سرنگونی حکومت اشغالگر اسلامی بدون روی آوردن به جنگ، خُشک کردن درآمدهای نفتی این رژیم اَنیرانی است، ولی کشورهای باختر تاکنون  تنها از بهر این نگران از بکارگیری این فرنامش (اقدام) خودداری کرده  اند، که میترسند آروایش (تحریم) نفتی این رژیم سبب بالارفتن بهای نفت در سراسر جهان شود؛  باآنکه عربستان سعودی آماده است و میتواند سهم ایران در فرآوری (تولید) نفت را که 2 میلیون بُشکه در روز است به آسانی جُبران کُند، ولی کشورهای باختر آماده-ی چنین سیجی (خطری) نیستند.

ولی با اینهمه چرا باختر باوجود داشتن آزمون هایِ درخشان و کامگارانه (موفقیت آمیز) در نبرد با شوروی کمونیستی و دیگر کشورهای خودکامه-ی خاور و بویژه کشور نژاد پرست آفریکای نیمروزی (آفریقای جنوبی)، میخواهد خود را به زور جنگ از شر حکومت اسلامی رها سازد؟ همانگونه که باختر توانست کشورهای خودکامه-ی کُمونیستی خاور و نژاد پرست آفریکای نیمروز (جنوبی) را از راه پیشکشیدنِ همزمان گفتمان های دادیک آدمی (حقوق بشر) و دُنبال کردنِ سیاست های جهانی و همبسته-ی آروایش های ترازداریک (تحریم های اقتصادی)، ناتوان ساخته و به زانو درآورد، اینبار نیز میتواند همین سیاست را در ایران برای سرنگونگی حکومت اشغالگر اسلامی بکار بگیردَ، با این ناسانی که سوای شُمار اندکی از مُزدوران، چماقدار و نیروهای سرکوبگر این حکومت اشغالگر، بخش بُزرگی از مردم ایران برای سرنگونی این رژیم اَنیرانی دَم شماری (لحظه شماری) میکُنند.

از اینرو، باختر باید مردم آزادیخواه ایران را در برآوُردهای سیاسی خود بگُنجانند که آرزوی زندگی در آسایش با یک ساختار مردمسالار و پیوستن دوباره به همبودگاه (جامعه-ی) آزادِ جهانی را دارند، و از نیروی بیکران و آسیم (عظیم) مردم ایران برای دستیافتن به دگرگونی سیاسی و دمکراتیک در ایران بهره ببرد. پیشکشیدن گفتمان های دادیک آدمی (حقوق بشری) از راه پُشتیبانی از کیفرخواست های جهانی برای دادگاهی کردن سران حنایتکار حکومت اسلامی و بیرون راندن نمایندگان این رژیم از نشست های جهانی، میتواند امید تازه ای به مردم ایران بدهد تا آنها را در راستای سرنگونی حکومت اسلامی با همبودگاه جهانی همراه سازد. یک حکومت میهنی و گیتیگرا (سکولار) در ایران که برآیند گُزیدمان (انتخابات) آزاد و رای آزاد مردم ایران باشد، بیگمان سود مردم ایران را از راه های آشتی جویانه و دوستانه با همبودگاه جهانی پیگیری خواهد کرد تا از راه دامن زدن به آتش جنگ، و گره گرفتاری هسته ای با کشورهای جهان را از راه دوستانه خواهد گُشود.

Tuesday, March 27, 2011

The "Merry Go Round" of Useless Negotiations and Ineffective Sanctions

March 27, 2011

Shaheen Fatmi*

After the spectacular failure of the latest round of discussions in Istanbul it is surprising that anyone would again seriously consider negotiations with the IRI over the nuclear issue.

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Oh, the merry-go-round broke down

As we went 'round and 'round

Each time 'twould miss we'd steal a kiss

While the merry-go-round went

After the spectacular failure of the latest round of discussions in Istanbul it is surprising that anyone would again seriously consider negotiations with the IRI over the nuclear issue. This next planned round of negotiations, is being entered into by both sides without much hope for progress on any of the real issues. Mr. Obama needs some pretext for keeping the congress and the American people away from his back and the IRI needs one more excuse for prolonging the misery it has imposed on the Iranian people. But the prospects for this latest round do not look any better than the previous ones. The ineffective sanctions and useless negotiations seem to serve both sides’ needs.

As a prelude to any negotiations with the representatives of the Five-Plus One group (P5+1) and the Islamic Republic's representative, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, Iran's outspoken President, declared that negotiations and sanctions cannot stop Iran's nuclear program: "The arrogant powers with 100 thousand resolutions cannot stop the progress of Iran's nuclear progress.” Mr. Ahmadinejad is not alone in calling negotiations and sanctions ineffective, Suzanne Maloney, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who worked on Iran issues under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, and has shown pro-Iranian regime tendencies in the past, seems to share his views: "It's almost impossible to find anyone here in Washington who believes sanctions will make any difference. The Iranian leadership has demonstrated that under pressure they are most averse to compromise."

She believes that the Islamic Republic has faced much more formidable diplomatic and economic pressures in its 31-year history, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War and when the price of oil fell to record lows. Other analysts, of the same persuasion, share the view that the new sanctions, particularly if combined with additional U.S. and EU measures directed at Iran's financial and energy sectors, are likely to strengthen hard-liners in Tehran and rally nationalist sentiment behind them.

On June 9, 2010 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1929 imposing additional international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program and military activities. This fourth resolution aimed at getting Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment programme since 2006, forbids U.N. members from transferring most conventional arms sales to Iran, calls for greater scrutiny of Iran's overseas banking operations, adds more Iranian companies and individuals to a U.N. blacklist, and authorizes countries to stop and inspect Iran-bound ships suspected of carrying cargo connected to Tehran's nuclear programme. This latest resolution passed by a margin of 12 in favor, two opposed (Brazil and Turkey and Lebanon abstaining. Previous sanctions resolutions against Iran were passed unanimously. The important element in this latest resolution was that all permanent members of Security Council were among those supporting the resolution.

While President Obama has characterized it as "the toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government" many other observers drastically disagree. The fact remains that in a draft resolution circulated in March, Washington had asked for mandatory sanctions denying Iran access to international banking services, capital markets and access to international airspace and waters for its commercial trade. Those provisions were deleted early in P5 discussions at the insistence of Russia and China, which succeeded in further diluting the resolution over the following three months. What is more alarming is the fact that most of the restrictions included in the final draft are voluntary.

Sanctions certainly have had some impact on Iran’s economy, but not to such a significant degree to force the regime to change its mind and abandon its policies. Apparently the ruling Mullah's and their cronies in the military have decided that they would rather retaliate against, and take steps to mitigate the damage of sanctions, than change their direction. None of the UN resolutions are strong enough to force the regime in Tehran to change its strategic calculations. In effect the U.N. sanctions against the regime are systematically watered down almost to nothing by Russia and China before they agree to vote for them. In addition both countries are vehemently opposed to any independent sanctions against the Iranian regime by the United States and the European Union outside of the U.N. framework.

The resumption of talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany (P5+1) in late January in Istanbul, does not seem to have any greater chance of success than numerous other meetings that similar groups have held with the representatives of the Islamic regime.

While the United States has had fairly comprehensive sanctions of its own in place on Iran for twenty years. The Iranians, though strained, have learned to live with. Beyond imposing its own sanctions, the U.S. efforts to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment program have been centered on building an international coalition to punish and isolate Iran through global sanctions until it alters its plans to build a nuclear program. In reaction to these efforts, Tehran maintains that its intentions are peaceful and is only interested in civilian uses of nuclear power. But it has refused both carrots and sticks offered by Western states to suspend its uranium enrichment program and many of these states believe the regime is intent on developing a nuclear weapons capability.

One final and most reliable approach which has not been yet tried is targeting Iran’s oil exports. This sector is indeed the linchpin in whether sanctions will be effective. Stopping Iran's ability to export its oil is obviously a double-edged sword for Iran. On the one hand it is Iran’s greatest vulnerability, due to its reliance on energy exports and foreign investment for its energy infrastructure; but it is also Iran’s ticket to enduring increasing economic burdens while expanding its nuclear program. If Iran were to lose its ability to sell its oil, the government could no longer survive for a long time. But at the same time such a measure would totally disrupt the world energy market. In spite of the fact that Iran's less than 2 million barbells a day of export could easily be replaced by Saudi Arabia's excess capacity, the psychological impact of such a measure would be difficult to foresee and minimize. The fact that so far this approach has not even been seriously considered is a good indication that it lays beyond the realm of realistic alternative for the policy makers.

Where do we go from here?

Thinking beyond this fruitless cat and mouse game will have to come to an end, leads us to one of the only two possible outcomes. Either Iran by persevering and ignoring all costs will continue with its nuclear program and eventually succeed in its efforts to build nuclear weapons and develop its delivery system. Or, alternatively, either Israel or the United States will succumb to the temptation of using military force, with all its ominous but inevitable consequences. Since neither of these two outcomes seems acceptable as rational or tolerable, one needs to think outside of the box and change both the rules and the players. The people of Iran who have been suffering under the pressure of sanctions and will eventually pay the ultimate price if the country is attacked, have had no say and no role in either government's decision to go nuclear or in influencing government policy in demanding policy shift. After the events of June 2008 and the brutal manner by which peoples' legitimate demands were suppressed, one does not need a Gallup poll to prove that this regime is unpopular and is holding on to power by shear force and brutality.

Considering the well established unpopularity of this regime and the fact that vast majority of the Iranian people oppose this government with its aggressive and brutal policies at home and abroad, one wonders why this element has not been integrated in the calculus of dealing with the regime. If enough concerted and meaningful international pressure were applied on the Islamic regime by major governments because of its drastic violations of basic human rights, a fact that has been repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations and numerous other organizations, this vulnerable regime would so follow the destiny of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Using the cause of the human rights would resonate far better with people of Iran and the international public opinion that the over-drawn debate over the nuclear issue.

Ultimately what brought Communism to its knees and lead to the demise of the Soviet Union and its East European puppets was the emphasis on the human rights issues and insistence on observation of the Helsinki Accords. The Iranian government is signatory to various United Nations covenants on observation of human rights. Forcing such issues on international tribunals by western countries will put the spotlight on this inhuman and brutal regime and give moral support to millions of Iranians who are eager for such international solidarity.

The events of the past two years have provided ample evidence in support of unpopularity and illegitimacy of the religious rulers in Iran. Regime change has become the only alternative left for the people. Such a change need not be by military or covert action. What is needed is open and public support for the struggle of the Iranian people and their legitimate aspirations. This can be accomplished through coordinated international actions, similar to those employed against South Africa which included expulsion from international events and organizations will weaken the regime and expedite its overthrow in similar fashion as we witnessed in Tunisia. Effective and concentrated actions on the international scene coordinated by encouragement of the internal resistance will weaken and eventually bring the regime to its knees.

Once the Iranian people of rid of this monstrous and terrorist regime, and replace it by a legitimate government of their own, the nation's foreign policy will no longer be determined by ideological and insane religious propaganda. A democratically elected government in Iran will strive to improve the well-being of the nation. Once the foreign policy of the country is determined on the basis of national interest instead of grandiose religious and ideological dogma, Iran will once again occupy its rightful place in the community of nations and with its sane foreign policy will contribute to the regional and international harmony among nations.

*A. S. Fatemi is President of the European Center for Advanced International Studies in Paris. He is also Professor of Economics at the American Graduate School in Paris.

1-The International Herald Tribune, Monday 24, January 2011

2-Radiofarda.com, Persian Edition, Tuesday, January 18, 2011

3-Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Event Summary - Iran: The Year of Reckoning, June 7, 2010

4-Oil and Gas Journal, January 2010, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Iran/Oil.html

5-Press and eye-witness reports of events of June 21-23, 2009-see The Economist, July 11, 2009.

http://www.iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news.pl?l=en&y=2011&m=03&d=27&a=1

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